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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Exchange market pressure (emp) reflects disequilibrium in money market. The 
traditional approaches used to examine the disequilibrium in money market include the 
monetary approach to balance of payments and monetary approach to exchange rate. 
Under the former approach the variation in foreign reserves helps restore the equilibrium 
while under the latter one the change in exchange rate does the needful.1   
The idea of this study stems from the fact that under the managed float exchange 
rate regime, changes in foreign reserves or changes in exchange rate in isolation are not a 
sufficient guide to characterise the external account situation of an economy. For 
example, exchange rate depreciation can be partially avoided or at least delayed if the 
central bank injects foreign currency in the forex market by letting its foreign reserves 
deplete. Alternatively, central bank can build up foreign reserves by purchasing foreign 
currency from the market against domestic currency. Such intervention would curb the 
exchange rate appreciation demanded by fundamentals. Therefore, focus on either of the 
two, that is, movement in exchange rate or variation in foreign reserves, to the complete 
exclusion of the other, is bound to portray a misleading picture of the external account 
situation. Given the foregoing a composite variable, that incorporates changes in 
exchange rate as well as variation in foreign reserves, over a certain period, is needed to 
characterise the condition of external account. The requisite composite variable has been 
developed by Girton and Roper (1977) as ‘simple sum of exchange rate depreciation and 
variation in foreign reserves scaled by monetary base’. They refer to it as exchange 
market pressure (emp). 
This study uses the composite variable emp rather than foreign reserves or 
exchange rate, to examine the interaction between monetary variables and external 
account. Specifically the study employs Granger Causality test to examine the nature of 
influence of monetary variables viz. domestic credit and interest rate upon exchange 
market pressure and vice versa. The analysis is likely to facilitate monetary management. 
The study also seeks to determine whether the instrument of domestic credit or interest  
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rate has been used by the authorities to manage exchange market pressure. The use of 
domestic credit implies quantitative monetary management i.e. directly varying the level 
of money supply whereas the use of interest rate implies market-based monetary 
management. The two monetary regimes carry different implications for the economy.  
The study is organised as follows: Section 2 is devoted to review of literature on 
emp model, Section 3 shows the theoretical framework for the study, Section 4 concerns 
data issues, Section 5 reports and analyses the results from econometric investigation and 
Section 6 concludes.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Seminal work on exchange market pressure, as a composite variable is of Girton 
and Roper (1977). They developed a model to explain both the exchange rate movement 
and variation in foreign reserves and referred to the composite variable (r + e ) as 
exchange market pressure, where r represents the change in foreign reserves scaled by 
monetary base (reserve money) and e reflects the percentage change in exchange rate 
over the period under consideration.  
2.1.  Girton and Roper’s emp Model 
Girton and Roper (henceforth GR) contend that equilibrium in domestic money 
market is achieved through movement in exchange rate and foreign reserves. Excess 
domestic money demand causes the exchange rate to appreciate or the foreign reserves to 
increase or some combination of the two. Similarly excess money supply causes the 
exchange rate to depreciate or the reserves to decline or some combination of the two. 
Under the GR formulation of emp model, the exchange market pressure is a 
function of three variables viz. growth in domestic credit, growth in foreign money 
supply and the differential between growth in domestic and foreign real income. The 
authors assume that, demand for money is stable (i.e. money multiplier is held constant), 
purchasing power parity holds, money market enjoys flow equilibrium and that the 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rate remains constant. 
The distinguishing features of GR’s monetary model of balance of payments 
(BOP) include; one, the dependent variable is exchange market pressure, defined as the 
sum r + e, rather than the BOP per se, second, GR’s model holds for all exchange rate 
regimes (of the dependent variable r +e, r and e are respectively zero, under floating and 
fixed exchange regimes, rest of the model remains unchanged). Third, the model views a 
country’s monetary policy as tight or loose only in a relative sense i.e. by reference to the 
monetary policy, generally, being practiced in rest of the world. 
The extensive applications of the GR model include, Cannolly and Silveira (1979) 
to Brazil, Paradhan, et al. (1989), to India, Modeste (1981) to Argentina, Kim (1985) to 
Korea and Wohar and Lee (1992) to Japan, Thornton (1995), Tanner (2001) for six East 
Asian countries, Kamaly and Erbil (2000) for three MENA region countries, Tanner 
(2002) for 32 countries and Bautista and Bautista (2005) for Philippines. 
The recent emp models assume a small open economy and thus step aside from 
monetary dependence apparent in GR’s model. In recent models foreign shocks influence 
the domestic economy through change in interest rate differential and inflation 
differential while in earlier models external shocks are transmitted to the domestic 
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economy through growth in foreign money supply. The recent models have also relaxed 
the assumption that purchasing power parity holds. Another improvement effected at 
empirical stage in recent studies is that the use of VAR methodology takes care of the 
endogeneity in the emp model, that earlier studies failed to tackle. Till Thornton (1995) 
the emp model was primarily used only to validate the monetary approach however 
recent studies also tend to examine whether the tool of monetary policy, vis-à-vis 
exchange market pressure, has been domestic credit or interest rate. 
Kamaly and Erbil (2000), Tanner (2001, 2002) and Bautista and Bautista (2005) 
have examined Granger causality between exchange market pressure and monetary 
variables using the emp model. The results vary across the countries examined and it is 
difficult to develop a common argument from the results examined.  
3.  THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1.  The Model 
To examine Granger causality between exchange market pressure and monetary 
variables, we use a model similar to the one used by Kamaly and Erbil (2000), Tanner 
(2001, 2002) and Bautista and Bautista (2005). The model is:   
   
*
jtjtjtjtjtt zyidcemp         … … … … (1) 
Where:  
empt : Exchange Market Pressure at time t,  
dct : Growth in domestic credit (scaled by monetary base),    
yt : Growth in real income,     
it : Growth in nominal interest rate,   
*
t
 
: Growth in international inflation,   
zt :  Deviation from Purchasing Power Parity,   
J : Number of lags.  
3.2.  Theoretical Underpinnings of the Model 
       
Domestic Credit: Positive Relationship with EMP 
The positive influence of domestic credit upon exchange market pressure has roots 
in monetary approach. The approach posits that excess money supply will be corrected by 
way of deficit on BOP while surplus on BOP will take care of the excess money demand. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime the adjustment burden, falls on foreign reserves, 
under free float; on exchange rate and both the foreign reserves and exchange rate share 
the adjustment burden under managed float. The adjustment proportion is determined by 
the monetary authority in its own discretion. 
Given the above an increase in domestic credit causes the exchange rate depreciate 
or foreign reserves to flow out or some combination of the two, that is, increase in 
exchange market pressure. Hence the positive impact of change in domestic credit upon 
exchange market pressure. 
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Interest Rate: Positive Relationship with EMP 
Keynesian theory of money demand holds that interest rate bears negative 
relationship with money demand. The following flow chart shows the channel through 
which interest rate exercises influence upon exchange market pressure. 
Increase in interest rate  decrease in real money demand (leading to 
excess supply)  Foreign reserves outflow/exchange rate depreciation  
increase in exchange market pressure. 
We predict a positive relationship between interest rate and exchange market 
pressure. Frenkel (1979) discusses conflicting views, viz. Chicago view and Keynesian 
view regarding the relationship between interest rate and exchange rate. The essence of 
Chicago view is indicated in the flow chart given above i.e. the increase in interest rate 
causes the money demand to decline which in turn causes the exchange rate to depreciate. 
This view predicts negative relationship between interest rate and exchange rate. The 
Keynesian view argues that increase in domestic interest rate given foreign interest rate 
makes the domestic securities more attractive. This attracts foreign capital into the 
country that causes the foreign reserves to increase and exchange rate to appreciate. Thus 
Keynesian view predicts a positive relationship between interest rate and exchange rate 
(i.e. increase in interest rate would lead to appreciation of exchange rate). The view 
assumes perfect capital mobility and one condition for capital mobility is that domestic 
and foreign securities should be equally risky.  
To assess the applicability of Keynesian channel in Pakistan let us assume that 
interest rate in Pakistan is sufficiently higher than that in US. Can we expect that 
Americans will transfer money from their banks in US to banks in Pakistan? 
Certainly not, the reason is that money in Pakistani banks is not considered as safe as 
in US. As Pakistani securities are perceived more risky relative to foreign ones 
therefore we do not expect the Keynesian view to hold in Pakistan. Given the non 
applicability of the Keynesian view we feel that only the Chicago view is at work in 
Pakistan and therefore we posit a positive relationship between interest rate and 
exchange market pressure.  
3.3.  Hypotheses 
We test the following hypotheses using Granger Causality2 
 
dct causes empt 
empt causes dct 
it causes empt 
empt causes it 
The Granger Causality has been estimated using the following: 
                 t tjt
k
j
j XYA
1
     … … … … … … (2)  
2For technical details of Granger Causality consult Gujrati (1998).  
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Where Y is a vector of (emp, dc, i and y)  endogenous variables and X is a vector of (zt 
*
t ) of exogenous variables.  
4. THE DATA  
4.1.  Data Span 
Data span of the study is: 1991:04-2005:12. Given that exchange market pressure 
model is particularly applicable to managed float (though it is possible to use the model 
for other exchange rate regimes as well), therefore one logical starting point of the data 
span is January 08, 1982—the day Pakistan adopted managed float. However we use 
1991 as the starting point because of the following. Prior to March 1991 interest rate was 
regulated by SBP, interest rate on Government Treasury Depository Receipts (GTDRs), 
whose features are similar to that of Treasury Bills now in vogue, was changed only  
once during the eight years preceding March 1991. This is enough to conclude that 
interest rate was not being used as an instrument of monetary policy prior to 1991.Our 
objective being to determine whether the dominant tool of monetary policy vis-à-vis 
exchange market pressure is ‘interest rate’ or ‘domestic credit’, we cannot include data 
prior to March 1991. Hence the small sample of 14.9 years that we have. Besides we use 
three sub-spans spanning over 7.2, 7.7 and 4.4 years. The characteristics of these sub-
spans are indicated in Table 1 below. 
                                                               
Table 1 
Data Span: Characteristics 
From To Peculiarity Length (Years) 
1991:04 2005:12 Initiation of the move towards market 
based monetary policy (Full span) 14.9 
1991:04 1998:05 Life period of Foreign Currency Deposits 
(FCDs) 7.2 
1998:06 2005:12 Post-FCDs freeze / 9/11 7.7 
2001:09 2005:12 Post 9/11 4.4 
 
The   motivation  for  the  full  span  of  14.9  years has been discussed above.  The 
motivation for the sub spans follows:  
4.1.1.  Sub-spans: 1991:04-1998:05 and 1998:06-05 
Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts (FCDs) during their short active life (1991-
98)3 had been not only a key source of foreign currency for the authorities but had led to 
dollarisation as well. Both in turn influenced exchange market pressure and the monetary 
policy. The developments call for analysis of the relationship that prevailed between the 
exchange market pressure and the monetary variables. Secondly in May 1998, as Pakistan  
3Fresh foreign currency accounts with banks were allowed shortly after the freeze on FCDs in May 
1998. However given the confidence shattering freeze, the fresh accounts have failed to mobilise the volumes 
that characterised the FCDs during 1991-98. Therefore we refer to the time period (1991-98) as active life of 
FCDs. 
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went Nuclear, foreign aid sanctions were imposed on Pakistan. The post-freeze/post-
sanctions span will allow us to examine as to how the authorities managed the pressure in 
the crises period.  
4.1.2. Sub-span: 2001:10-2005:12 
Certain events triggered by 9/11 led to dramatic reduction in exchange market 
pressure. It is important to see how the monetary policy reacted to the change in the 
direction of exchange market pressure. Hence we use the data-span 2001:09-2005:12.  
4.2.  Frequency 
Data frequency is monthly. The motivation for using high frequency data is that 
the data among others, includes, domestic credit, interest rate, exchange rate and foreign 
reserves. These variables have dynamic properties that can be best captured with high 
frequency data. Besides, as mentioned above, we have a relatively small sample of 14.9 
years. Given the small sample size, the use of annual data is ruled out for reliable 
econometric investigation. Similarly, the smaller sub-spans, referred above, rules out the 
use of quarterly data as well.  
4.3.  Variables 
The variables included in the empirical model given by Equation (2) are: 
Exchange Market Pressure (empt), Domestic Credit (dct), Interest rate [Six month T-bill 
rate: (it)], Real income [Proxy: Industrial production (yt)]4, International inflation [Proxy: 
U.S. inflation (p*t)] and Deviation from purchasing power parity (zt).  
Of the six variables mentioned above, data for the series’ it, yt and p*t are directly 
available in published statistics while data for the series dct, empt and zt is to be generated. 
This in turn requires data on some more variables. (The generation of the series’ is discussed 
in Annexure A).  In all we require data on: nominal exchange rate, foreign reserves, Industrial 
production index, domestic credit, interest rate and CPI (US and Pakistan). The data has been 
obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-ROM (May 2006).   
4.4.  Stationarity 
All the data series have been tested for absence of unit root. The tests employed 
include Dickey Fuller/ Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the seasonal unit root test 
proposed by Baeulieu and Miron (1993). We employ the seasonal root test because the 
monthly data is more prone to seasonality. The ADF test as well as the seasonal unit root 
test shows that all the series exhibit stationarity. The result is not surprising as the model 
employs all variables in growth form.  
5.  ESTIMATION OF THE EMP MODEL 
To conduct the Granger causality test we have estimated Equation 2 using 
appropriate restrictions depending upon the hypothesis to be tested. Before estimating  
4Monthly data on real income is not available. The use of industrial production as proxy for real income 
is well established. 
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Equation 2 we have determined the lag structure of the variables using the standard AIC 
method. Besides we have additionally ensured that residuals of the concerned regressions 
do not exhibit serial correlation. The foregoing process delivers the lags mentioned 
against the respective data spans in Table 2.                                                                                                           
 Table 2 
Data Spans: Lags of Dependent Variables for VAR System  
Interval 
Duration: 
No. of 
Years 
Lags of 
Dependent 
Variable 
Full Span 1991:04-2005:12 14.9 4 
Post Liberalisation 1995-2005 11 3 
FCD Span 1991-04-1998-05
 
7.2 2 
Post FCD Freeze/Post-aid sanctions/ 9/11 1998:06-2005:12 7.7 2 
Post 9/11 2001:09-2005:12 4.4 2 
Granger causality test results for the hypotheses indicated in section 3.3 are 
reported below in Table 3 below.  
Table 3 
Granger Causality Test: Results 
Null Hypothesis 
Full: 91:04-
05:12 
FCD: 91:04-
98:05 
OMOs 
Initiation 
95-05 
FCD-Freeze
98-05 
9/11 
01:10-05:12
dct causes empt no 
(1.37) 
no 
(0.74) 
no 
(0.31) 
yes 
(2.40) 
yes 
(3.87) 
empt causes dct  no 
(0.87) 
no 
(1.86) 
no 
(0.69) 
no 
(1.10) 
no 
(0.66) 
it causes empt no 
(0.79) 
no 
(0.48) 
no 
(1.35) 
no 
(1.10) 
yes 
(2.11) 
empt causes it yes 
(4.03) 
yes 
(2.48) 
yes 
(3.25) 
no 
(0.21) 
no 
(0.51) 
F-statistics in parenthesis.  
5.1.  Causality from Domestic Credit to Exchange Market Pressure5 
As evident from Table 3 the test results show that domestic credit causes exchange 
market pressure in the Granger-sense only in the post FCD freeze and post 9/11 span. The 
causality from domestic credit to exchange market pressure observed during the two 
spans implies that volume of domestic credit, during the two period referred above, has at  
5Before we discuss the results from Granger causality test it is important to emphasise that Granger 
causality does not essentially imply economic causality [Hamilton (1994)]. For example expectations of 
changes in reserves could cause domestic credit to change. This would cause domestic credit to change today, 
so that the Granger causality would seem to run from domestic credit to reserves but the true causality goes 
from expectations of reserves to domestic credit.  
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least partially been determined by the level of upcoming magnitude of exchange market 
pressure. In other words monetary policy has been influenced by exchange market 
pressure considerations. An evidence of this is the intervention activity of the central 
bank in the forex market from 1999-04. The exact year-wise volume of intervention 
during these years is indicated below in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Purchase /Sale of Foreign Currency by SBP 
US $: in Millions 
    Period Interbank (Net) Kerb Purchases Net Addition FR* 
1999-2000 –797.0** 1633.4 836.4 
2000-2001 –1125.6** 2157.3 1031.7 
2001-2002 2483.0 1375.7 3858.7 
2002-2003 4546.0 429.3 4975.3 
2003-2004 896.8 0.00 896.8 
Source: SBP annual reports (various reports). 
          * FR stands for foreign reserves.  
        **The negative sign with the figures indicates sale of foreign currency.  
The intervention activity for the period 1999-00 to 03-04 can be separated into two 
sub-periods with opposing exchange market pressure scene. The objectives of 
intervention in the two periods are discussed below. 
The first period, starting with May 1998 reflects the period when economic-aid 
sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in the wake of going Nuclear then. The foreign 
reserves held by the central bank stood at a relatively level low of $1.28 billion and the 
foreign currency accounts with commercial banks stood freezed i.e. depositors were not 
allowed to encash their deposits in foreign currency. 
Under the foreign currency deposits (FCDs) scheme initiated in March 1991 the 
residents were allowed to hold foreign currency accounts with commercial banks. The 
foreign currency mobilised by banks under the scheme was surrendered to SBP against 
Rupee equivalent. Thus the foreign currency deposits used to augment the foreign 
currency resources at the disposal of central bank, though technically the deposits were 
not a part of foreign reserves. As the FCDs mobilised by banks were surrendered to SBP 
therefore the foreign reserves were a natural hedge against default on foreign currency 
deposits. Upon imposition of sanctions in May 1998, with foreign reserves at a rather low 
level and prospects of improvement in foreign reserves being rather dim, due to aid 
sanctions, it was but logical for the people to expect that the government/SBP will not be 
able to fulfill its obligation regarding the redemption of FCDs.  
In the light of the above, the government feared a run on foreign currency deposits. 
To cope with the situation the government imposed a freeze on foreign currency deposits. 
The foreign currency account holders were allowed to withdraw only Rupee equivalent of 
the foreign currency held in their accounts. The default on the part of the government, to 
redeem FCDs in foreign currency besides shattering the confidence of the depositors had 
an adverse impact on foreign investment as well.  
The following flowchart indicates the mechanics as to how remittances at different 
times had fed the foreign reserves.   
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Remittances        Kerb Market
Foreign Currency for RFCDs
SBP’s $ Purchases from Kerb
1998-2003
SBP
1991:04-1998:05
  
The flow chart, shows that FCDs were merely a channel of transferring 
remittances from the kerb market to the SBP. The freeze on FCDs closed the channel for 
such transfers. The premium between open market exchange rate and the official 
exchange rate being rather high at that point in time (i.e. May 1998),  the inflow of 
remittances through formal banking channel was not expected then.6 Under the given 
scenario the SBP purchased foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency, from 
the kerb/inter bank market in 99-00 and 00-01 to bolster its depleted reserves. The 
purchase obviously resulted in expansion of domestic credit. This shows that the 
increment in reserves, resulting from expansion in domestic credit, relieved the exchange 
market pressure.  Thus exchange market pressure consideration led to expansion in 
domestic credit or in other words monetary policy became subordinate to external 
account situation. 
The intervention activity undertaken post 9/11 was undertaken in an entirely 
different backdrop. Post 9/11 the exchange market pressure in Pakistan improved 
dramatically. The substantial improvement in exchange market pressure was mainly due 
to three reasons: (i) quantum jump in remittances from overseas Pakistanis, (ii) 
Reprofiling/waiver of foreign loans, and (iii) some improvement in macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Table 5 gives an idea about the extent of improvement in exchange market 
pressure.                         
                                                                                           
Table 5 
Exchange Rate Appreciation and Increase in Foreign Reserves  
Sept. 2001 Dec. 2003 Appreciation/Increase 
Exchange Rate RS. 64.20 RS. 57.21 12 % 
Foreign Reserves $2,149 $10,941 409 % 
                           
In just two months since 9/11 the exchange rate had appreciated by 5.2 percent and 
the foreign reserves had registered an improvement of almost 50 percent over the figure 
just prior to 9/11. The appreciation of exchange rate was hurting the export 
competitiveness of the country. Given this the authorities decided to stall/slowdown the 
appreciation of exchange rate. Consequently the central bank purchased foreign currency 
to the tune of $9.7 billion from July 01- June 04 (Table 4), from the interbank as well as  
6As the open market exchange rate was at a premium over the official rate, the conversion of $s into 
Rupees yielded more Rupees in the open market. Therefore the overseas Pakistanis preferred to send money 
through the informal channel (i.e. hundi) instead of remitting it through banks. The foreign currency thus 
remitted ended up in the open market rather than in SBP. 
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the kerb market, in exchange for domestic currency, thereby increasing domestic credit 
(money supply). Thus once again domestic credit was used to manage exchange market 
pressure—this time to contain the appreciation of Rupee rather than manage an increase 
in foreign reserves. The foregoing discussion shows that, domestic credit was extensively 
used to manage exchange market pressure. The following statement included in SBP 
annual report confirms the point. 
Over the last few years, while monetary policy gained a degree of 
independence from fiscal policy, it remained captive to the exchange rate 
considerations. Interestingly, these shackles persisted through the whole of 
FY02 despite the current account surpluses seen post-September 2001, 
which led to a considerable appreciation of the Rupee. However, the focus 
changed dramatically during the year as the emphasis shifted from 
preventing a depreciation of the Rupee, to avoiding a very abrupt 
appreciation (SBP Annual Report: 2001-02). 
Thus the central bank followed a proactive monetary policy to stall the appreciation of 
Rupee, that is, in anticipation of the expected level of exchange market pressure the central 
bank changed the level of domestic credit to manage exchange market pressure.  
5.2.  Causality from Exchange Market Pressure to Interest Rate 
Now we take up the causality observed from exchange market pressure to interest 
rate during the FCD span. For the interest rate channel to work some avenue is needed 
through which foreign funds may flow. Foreign currency accounts had been the said 
avenue during the period 1991:04 to 1998:06. With the freeze on foreign currency 
accounts in May 1998 the avenue stood closed and hence the absence of causality from 
exchange market pressure to interest rate for the spans that encompass post FCDs-freeze 
period. To substantiate our point we present a comparison of yield on FCDs and deposits 
denominated in domestic currency in Table 6.   
Table 6 
Yield Comparison: FCDs and Domestic Deposits  
Year 
(1)* 
Avg. Return on 
FCDs 
(2) 
Exch.Rate 
Depreciation 
(3) 
=(1)+(2) FCDs 
Yield * 
(4)* 
Wtd. Avg. Rate on 
Domestic Deposits
 
(5) 
T.Bill Rate 
(6 months) 
91-92 6.0 3.42 9.42 7.59 12.22 
92-93 6.0 8.08 14.08 7.70 12.43 
93-94 6.0 12.70 18.70 8.04 10.96 
94-95 6.0 1.31 9.31 8.18 12.73 
95-96 6.0 13.19 19.19 8.24 13.03 
96-97 6.0 15.27 21.27 8.49 16.05 
97-98 6.0 13.69 19.69 8.38 15.70 
Note:  The average rate on Defense Savings Certificate (DSC) was 13.8 percent however this includes the rate 
on  DSCs of longer term maturity (5-10 years) whereas the FCDs were mainly of short-term maturity. 
           * SBP annual report 97-98 p.116. 
           ** SBP statistical handbook. 
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The data in Table 6 shows that yield on FCDs was always above the weighted 
average rate paid on deposits denominated in local currency and was also more often 
greater than average return on Defence Savings Certificates—the highest yield securities 
denominated in local currency.7  
From 1991 to 1998, the exchange market pressure had generally been positive and 
relatively higher, during this period the interest rate had also exhibited a rising trend. The 
causality from exchange market pressure to interest rate leads us to infer that during the 
years the authorities used the interest rate to defend the Rupee. Remittances from 
overseas workers after having reached a peak of $2.8 billion in 1982 had started tapering-
off. To cope with the shortage of foreign currency the government allowed the residents 
to hold foreign currency accounts. The yield on FCDs being higher than the deposits 
denominated in domestic currency, there was trend among residents to hold their savings 
as FCDs for which the foreign currency was being purchased from the kerb market. It is 
noteworthy here that the non-resident FCDs that were allowed in 1991 stood at $6.9 
billions at the time of freeze in 1998. The dollarisation, in this manner, increased the 
demand for foreign currency in the open market and there by led to the depreciation of 
Rupee. To avoid importing inflation the SBP had to defend the Rupee by increasing the 
return (interest rate) on domestic assets [Mirakhor and Zaidi (2006)]. Thus the exchange 
rate depreciation, a component of exchange market pressure, led to increase in interest 
rate. This explains the Granger causality from exchange market pressure to interest rate 
during the FCD span. The impact of the causality observed in the FCD span (a sub-span) 
is strong enough so as to make it observable in the full span as well.  
5.3.  Causality from Interest Rate to Exchange Market Pressure 
Causality from interest rate to exchange market pressure is observed in the post 
9/11 span. 9/11, for reasons outlined earlier, did cast a favourable impact upon the 
exchange market pressure, at least, in the immediate future. Post 9/11, the external 
account position improved dramatically; the foreign reserves registered a quantum jump 
and the exchange rate was on an appreciation for the first time in Pakistan’s history. 
Given the exchange rate appreciation and the comfortable foreign reserves position the 
need to defend the Rupee was no longer there. Therefore the central bank could afford to 
practice a loose monetary policy, which otherwise was also required to give a much 
needed boost to the economy, and this is what the central bank actually did, as the interest 
on 6-months treasury bills declined by 929 basis points in 22 months (Oct. 01-July 03). 
Thus the improvement in exchange market pressure led to the decline in interest rate. 
This point of view is supported by the following excerpt from SBP annual report: 
The continued forex inflows coupled with low inflationary pressures during 
FY03 allowed, the SBP to reduce the discount rate to an all-time low at 7.5 
percent in November 2002. This led to a lowering of lending rates. (SBP 
Annual report: 2002-03 p.147). 
Given this we should have observed the causality from exchange market pressure 
to interest rate in the post 9/11 span, however, in practice the causality observed is the  
7To make the comparison between returns on FCDs and domestic instruments more meaningful it is 
note worthy that unlike FCDs domestic instruments were subjected to taxes and Zakat deductions. Accounting 
for such deduction would make the return on domestic instrument lesser than that shown in the Table 6. 
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other way round. The reason lies in the fact that the post 9/11 span encompasses a period 
of 52 months in total out which the interest rate was on a downward course for the initial 
22 months only. For the remaining 30 months (Aug.03-Dec.05), interest rate followed an 
upward path and the exchange rate after ending the appreciation spell in December 2003 
was on the depreciation course for remaining 2 years of the post 9/11 data span. Thus it 
was the upcoming pressure on exchange rate that forced the SBP to raise interest rate—to 
defend the Rupee. This suggests that we should be able to observe causality from interest 
rate to exchange market pressure in the post 9/11 span, as in practice is the case. Having 
described above the possibility of causality in two opposing directions, the fact that 
causality observed during the post 9/11 span is from interest rate to exchange market 
pressure and not the other way round implies that that the depreciation pressure on 
exchange rate since January 2004 outweighed the positive effect of exchange rate 
appreciation during the earlier part of the span so that the ultimate causality observed, 
during, the span is from interest rate to exchange market pressure.  
6.  CONCLUSION 
The magnitude of exchange market pressure carries implications for the level of 
inflation and host of other macroeconomic variables. Given this the authorities tend to 
manage exchange market pressure. The instruments used range from quantitative controls 
to influencing the level of interest rate or money supply. The use of interest rate implies 
greater reliance on the market forces and the tilt of the managed float towards floating 
exchange rate regime while the use of money supply implies more reliance on the 
monetary authority and tilt of the managed float towards fixed exchange rate regime.  
We have examined the interaction between exchange market pressure and 
monetary variables viz. interest rate and domestic credit (reserve money) using Granger 
causality test. Causality in the Granger sense is observed from exchange market pressure 
to interest rate during the active life of FCDs (1991-98). However the instrument of 
managing exchange market pressure seems to have undergone a change with the freeze 
on FCDs as causality from interest rate to exchange market pressure has been replaced by 
causality from domestic credit to exchange market pressure in the post FCD freeze span 
and post 9/11 span.  
During the active life FCDs (1991-98) dollarisation led to depreciation of Rupee 
that in turn contributed to inflation. To avoid importing inflation the SBP had to defend 
the Rupee with the increment in interest rate. With the freeze on FCDs, dollarisation 
came to a grinding halt therefore the increment in interest was no more needed to defend 
the Rupee. However the low level of foreign reserves forced the authorities to resort to 
outright purchase of foreign currency from the open market thereby increasing domestic 
component of money supply. Thus the instrument of managing exchange market pressure 
changed from interest rate to money supply. Post 9/11 given the unanticipated foreign 
inflows SBP purchased foreign currency from the market to maintain competitiveness of 
our exports—again using money supply to manage the exchange market pressure. Thus 
the use of monetary instrument vis-à-vis exchange market pressure has varied with need 
of the day. However the use of interest rate being a consequence of FCDs and 
dolarisation only, it is mainly the money supply that is ordinarily used to manage 
exchange market pressure. 
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ANNEXURE - A  
Domestic Credit 
Reserve Money being composed of domestic and foreign components, the 
domestic credit is worked out as the difference between total Reserve Money and the 
foreign component of Reserve Money. The foreign component is obtained by multiplying 
the month-end foreign reserves outstanding with the relevant month-end nominal 
exchange rate. To work out the Domestic Credit in the manner referred above, we need 
data on the following series. 
 
Reserve Money 
Foreign Reserves 
Nominal Exchange Rate  
Exchange Market Pressure 
Exchange market pressure (emp), defined as sum of exchange rate depreciation 
and foreign reserves outflow scaled by monetary base (Reserve money) requires data on 
the following:                                  
Nominal Exchange Rate 
Foreign Reserves 
Reserve Money 
The data required for generating the Exchange market pressure series is exactly the 
same as required for generating domestic credit series.  
Deviation from Purchasing Power Parity  
As explained earlier under theoretical framework deviation from purchasing power 
parity (PPP) is to be worked out as per Equation (A-1) which after slight algebraic 
manipulation is reproduced below for ready reference.  
tttt ez
* 
… … … … … … … (A-1)   
To generate the series ‘Deviation from PPP’ (zt) we need data on the following: 
Nominal Exchange Rate  
International Price Level (Proxy: US CPI) 
Domestic Price Level (CPI).  
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